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Introduction 
 
Unlike the United States, the European Union (EU) did traditionally not have motivations to privilege its 
relations  with  Central  America.
1 T h e  e c o n o m i c ,  p o l i t i c a l  a n d  g e o s t r a t e g i c  i n t e r e s t s  i n  t h e  r e g i o n  a r e    
modest, as compared with those existing in other groups of less developed countries (LDCs) such as the 
so-called  African,  Caribbean  and  Pacific  countries  (ACP  countries)  and  the  Southern  and  Oriental 
Mediterranean  countries  (MEDA  countries).  Nevertheless,  the  threat  of  an  internationalization  of  the 
Central American conflict after the victory of the Sandinista Front in Nicaragua in 1979, was able to 
attract EU’s attention towards the region and encourage a greater involvement in it. The EU took the 
initiative in institutionalizing a political dialogue –the San José Dialogue–,
2 which has facilitated the 
signing of three multilateral cooperation agreements between the two regions in 1985, 1993 and 2003. 
The subscription of the last Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement in 2003 opened the 
possibility of strengthening the bi-regional relations, which had been losing dynamism since the end of 
the Central American conflict. The chosen way has been the negotiation of an Association Agreement 
(AA), including –in addition to political dialogue and cooperation –  the establishment of a bi-regional 
free trade area. The results of this negotiation initiated in 2007, will condition the future of the relations 
between both regions. 
This  paper  aims  at  assessing  the  bi-regional e c o n o m i c  r e l a t i o n s  i n  t h e  c o n t e x t  o f  t h e  
aforementioned negotiation. With this purpose, the paper is divided into four sections. The first two ones 
present respectively, the state of the trade and financial relations. After that, the third section analyzes the 
background to the negotiation of the AA and the major negotiation issues. The fourth and last section 
provides the main conclusions drawn from that analysis. 
 
Trade Relations 
 
The three multilateral cooperation agreements signed by the EU with Central America have contained the 
reciprocal  recognition  of  the  most-favored-nation  (MFN)  clause.  However,  this  has  not  implied  the 
extension to the Central American countries of the tariff advantages granted by the EU to other LDCs 
more privileged by historical and geostrategic links, such as the ACP and MEDA countries. The MFN 
treatment involves the signatory countries’ commitment to give to each other the most favorable tariff 
terms negotiated with any single trading partner, except when such terms are result of an agreement 
setting up a customs union or are given only to certain countries –as it has happened until recently, to the 
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1 Throughtout this paper Central America is regarded as the region comprising the five member countries of the Central 
American Common Market, i.e. Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras y Nicaragua. 
    
2 The San José Dialogue takes place between the EU and the six countries of the Central American isthmus (the five members 
of the Central American Common Market and Panama). ACP  and  MEDA  countries
3–  i n  c o m p l i a n c e  w i t h  t h e  r e g u l a t i o n s  e s t a b l i s h e d  b y  t h e  W o r l d  T r a d e  
Organization (WTO). 
  The Central American countries have not had access to special trade preferences other than those 
offered by the EU to all LDCs under its Generalized System of Preferences (GSP).This trade arrangement 
comprises  a  general  regime  and  several  special  regimes,  being  intended  to  facilitate  access  of  LDC 
exports to the EU market. The general regime provides tariff preferences for exports of manufactured and 
semi-manufactured  goods,  while  the  special  regimes  broaden  the  product  coverage  for  specific 
beneficiary  countries.  Central  America  enjoys  the  general  regime  since  1971  and  one  of  the  special 
regimes since January 1, 1992, specifically the one supporting the struggle against the production and 
trafficking of drugs (known as GSP-Drugs). This special regime allowed to incorporate into the GSP a 
group of agricultural products –most of them, non-traditional products–  regarded as substitute crops 
replacing coca. 
In  the  last  2005  GSP  renewal,  the  EU  has  simplified  its  format  for  the  decade  2006-2015 
including  only  three  regimes:  the  general  one  and  two  special  ones  –the  incentive  arrangement  for 
sustainable development and good governance (known as GSP+) and the Everything But Arms (EBA) 
arrangement
4–. The GSP+ came into force on July 1, 2005, whereas the rest of regimes did it on January 
1,  2006.
5 T h e  G S P +  h a s  r e p l a c e d  t h e  GSP-Drugs,  maintaining  its  product  coverage.  The  GSP+ 
beneficiary countries are bound to ratify and implement international conventions in the fields of human 
rights, core labor standards, environmental protection and good governance, as a demonstration of their 
firm commitment to these issues. 
Bi-regional trade relations have taken place under the described framework. After doubling their 
value in 2000 with respect to the recorded one in the first half of the 1990s,  these trade relations have 
tended to stagnate in the present decade. As Table 1 shows, EU imports from Central America increased 
from €1,845 million in 1995 to €4,312 million in 2000 and since then, they kept an average value of 
€4,337 million in the 2000-2007 period. Similarly, EU exports to Central America expanded from €1,742 
million in 1995 to €3,721 million in 2000, maintaining an average value of €4,064 million in the 2000-
2007 period. 
The bi-regional trade balance was unfavorable to the EU in the aforementioned period, except in 
2001 and 2007. Nevertheless, the average amount of the EU’s trade deficit was very small, just €273 
million. This slight deficit represents almost the half of the value of the EU’s trade surplus in 2007 (€539 
million). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
    
3 The EU has established a degree of trade preferences with LDCs according to their historical and geostrategic links. This has 
given rise to a “hierarchy of preferences”, in which the former colonies of some member states –the ACP countries – have been 
particularly favored. Nevertheless, this trade policy is being modified to adapt it to the WTO regulations emanated from the 
Uruguay Round. The EU has to reduce progressively the unilateral tariff advantages and replace them by free trade agreements 
with reciprocal tariff preferences. 
    
4  The  EBA  arrangement  provides  duty-free  and  quota-free  access  to  the  EU  market  for  all  products  (except  arms  and 
armaments) from the 50 Least Developed Countries recognized by the United Nations. For more details on this arrangement and  
the  EU’s  new  GSP  scheme,  see:  the  website  of  the  European  Commission  Directorate  General  for  Trade, 
http://ec.europa.eu/trade/issues/global/gsp. 
    
5 The GSP+ entered into effect before January 1, 2006,  to comply with the ruling of the WTO Appellate Body in relation to 
the challenge against the GSP-Drugs presented by India, claiming that this GSP special regime discriminated among LDCs and 
thus, was contrary to the WTO Enabling Clause. 
 Table 1  
EUROPEAN UNION: TRADE BALANCE WITH CENTRAL AMERICA,
a 1995 AND 2000-2007  
(in millions of euros and in percentages) 
 
 
Exports
 
 
Imports 
 
 
Balance 
 
 
 
 
Year 
 
 
 
 
Value 
 
(€ million) 
 
Share in  
total exports
b  
(%)  
 
Value 
 
(€ million) 
 
Share in  
total imports
b  
(%) 
 
Value 
 
(€ million) 
 
1995 
 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
 
2000-2007 
average 
 
 
1,742 
 
3,721 
3,511 
3,694 
3,802 
3,910 
3,711 
4,860 
5,301 
 
 
4,064 
 
0.3 
 
0.4 
0.4 
0.4 
0.4 
0.4 
0.4 
0.4 
0.4 
 
 
0.4 
 
1,845 
 
4,312 
3,414 
3,737 
4,076 
4,432 
4,830 
5,131 
4,762 
 
 
4,337 
 
0.4 
 
0.4 
0.3 
0.4 
0.4 
0.4 
0.4 
0.4 
0.3 
 
 
0.4 
 
   -103 
 
   -590 
      97 
     -42 
   -274 
   -522 
-1,119 
   -271 
    539 
 
 
  -273 
 
 
Source: Derived from: COMEXT database, Eurostat, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/. 
a  Panama is included. 
b Total exports (imports) exclude intra-European Union exports (imports). 
 
What has not been altered is the limited relevance of Central America as EU’s trade partner: it 
accounts for only 0.4 per cent of total extra-EU trade (see Table 1).  Costa Rica is the EU’s major Central 
American trade partner, constituting 61 per cent of  total Central American exports to the EU in the 2000-
2007 period and nearly 40 per cent of total Central American imports from the EU in the same period (see 
Figure 1). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 1 
CENTRAL AMERICA: GEOGRAPHIC BREAKDOWN OF TRADE
a WITH THE EUROPEAN 
UNION, 2000-2007 AVERAGE 
(in percentages of total) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Derived from: SEC-SIECA (Sistema de Estadísticas de Comercio – Secretaría  de Integración 
Económica Centroamericana) database, http://estadisticas.sieca.org.gt/. 
a The value of assembly manufacture is excluded. 
 
 
Table 2 
CENTRAL AMERICA: MAIN TRADE PARTNERS, 2000-2007 AVERAGE 
(in percentages of total) 
 
       
Trade partner  Exports
a  Imports
a    
       
United States 
Mexico 
Central American Common Market 
Belize 
Panama 
South America 
Caribbean 
European Union 
Asia 
Rest of the world 
 
Total 
37.1 
2.8 
26.8 
0.4 
2.5 
1.5 
4.3 
13.9 
8.8 
1.9 
 
100.0 
 
38.9 
7.3 
13.1 
0.1 
2.9 
10.7 
3.4 
9.1 
11.8 
2.7 
 
100.0 
 
 
 
Source: Derived from: SEC-SIECA (Sistema de Estadísticas de Comercio – Secretaría  de Integración 
Económica Centroamericana) database, http://estadisticas.sieca.org.gt/. 
a The value of assembly manufacture is excluded.  
From the Central American perspective, the relative importance of the EU market is much higher. 
After the United States and the Central American Common Market (CACM), the EU is the third trade 
partner of the region, absorbing almost 14 per cent of its exports and supplying a little over 9 per cent of 
its imports in the first eight years of the present decade (see Table 2). Nevertheless, its relative importance 
is much lower than that of the United States. Geographical proximity and trade agreements signed with 
this country –both preferential (the Caribbean Basin Initiative, CBI) and reciprocal (the United States-
Dominican Republic-Central America Free Trade Agreement, DR-CAFTA)– have consolidated to the 
United States as the major trade partner of the region.  This fact along with the recovery of intra-CACM 
trade have reduced EU’s trade share since the beginning of the 1990s. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 
CENTRAL AMERICA: SECTORAL BREAKDOWN OF TRADE
a WITH THE EUROPEAN 
UNION, 2000-2006 AVERAGE 
(in percentages of total) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Derived from: SIECA (Secretaría de Integración Económica Centroamericana), Centroamérica: 
indicadores y estadísticas de comercio exterior, 2000-2006 (Guatemala: SIECA, 2007). 
SITC Rev.3: Standard International Trade Classification Revision No. 3 
a The value of assembly manufacture is excluded. 
 
  
Table 3 
CENTRAL AMERICA: MAIN PRODUCTS OF EXPORT AND IMPORT IN TRADE
a WITH 
THE EUROPEAN UNION, 2007 
 (in millions of US dollars and in percentages of total) 
 
 
Product and  SAC Code 
 
Value 
 
% 
 
 
EXPORTS 
1.  Gold coffee (09011130) 
2.  Fresh bananas (08030011) 
3.  Tropical pineapples (08043000) 
4.  Parts and accessories for machines (84733000) 
5.  Tunas, stripe-bellied and bonitos (16041410) 
6.  Cultured shrimps (03061311) 
7.  Foliage, leaves and branches of plants (06049190) 
8.  Syringes, including with needle (90183990) 
9.  Melons, watermelons and papayas (08071900)   
10. Absolute alcohol (22071010)   
11. Zinc minerals (26080000) 
12. Alive plants (06029090) 
13. Preserves, jellies and marmalades (20079990)  
14. Marine diesel (27101922) 
15. Pineapple juice brix (20094100) 
16. Burley tobacco (24012020)   
17. Pineapple juice without fermenting (20094900) 
18. Palm hearts (20089100) 
19. Peanuts (12022090) 
20. Parts and accessories of cameras (90079100) 
 
Total of the 20 main exports 
 
21. Rest of products 
TOTAL EXPORTS 
 
IMPORTS 
1.  Other petrols (27101130)   
2.  Antimalarial medicaments (30049091)   
3.  Digital integrated circuits (85423120)   
4.  Metal oxide semiconductors (85422110)   
5.  Coiling and curling machines (84622900)   
6.  Current carrying telecommunication appliances 
(85176110)   
7.  Appliances for receiving, converting and transmitting 
data (85176200)   
8.  Automobiles (87032369)   
9.  Telephone parts (85177000)   
10. Other transmitting appliances (85176129)   
11. Laminated products (72083900)   
12. Ammonium nitrate (31023000)   
 
 
778 
347 
262 
241 
81 
68 
60 
50 
37 
37 
35 
33 
31 
22 
18 
17 
15 
15 
14 
13 
 
2,174 
 
337 
2,511 
 
 
220 
187 
183 
68 
54 
35 
32 
31 
31 
31 
30 
29 
29 
27 
 
 
31.0 
13.8 
10.4 
9.6 
3.2 
2.7 
2.4 
2.0 
1.5 
1.5 
1.4 
1.3 
1.2 
0.9 
0.7 
0.7 
0.6 
0.6 
0.6 
0.5 
 
86.6 
 
13.4 
100.0 
 
 
6.2 
5.3 
5.2 
1.9 
1.5 
1.0 
0.9 
0.9 
0.9 
0.9 
0.8 
0.8 
0.8 
0.8 
 13. Fuels type diesel for cars (27101921)  
14. Envelopes, cards and other articles for correspondence 
(49070020)   
15. Ceramic plates and slabs (69089000)   
16. Electricity-generating groups (85021300)  
17. Ammonium sulfate (31022100)   
18. Food preparations for breastfed babies (19011011)   
19. Mineral based oil (27101991)  
20. Machines for filling, closing and labeling bottles 
(84223090)   
 
Total of the 20 main imports 
 
21. Rest of products 
TOTAL IMPORTS 
 
27 
27 
26 
20 
19 
19 
 
1,125 
 
2,418 
3,543 
0.8 
0.8 
0.7 
0.6 
0.5 
0.5 
 
31.8 
 
68.2 
100.0 
 
Source: Derived from: SEC-SIECA (Sistema de Estadísticas de Comercio – Secretaría  de Integración 
Económica Centroamericana) database, http://estadisticas.sieca.org.gt/. 
SAC: Sistema Arancelario Centroamericano (Central American Tariff System) 
a The value of assembly manufacture is excluded. 
 
 
The  sectoral  analysis  of  the  bi-regional t r a d e  r e v e a l s  a  t y p i c a l  p a t t e r n  o f  N o r t h -South  trade. 
Central America exports primary products very vulnerable to international price fluctuations and imports 
higher added-value manufactured products. As Figure 2 illustrates, in the 2000-2006 period,  75.2 per 
cent of its exports to the EU corresponded to primary products, while 87.3 per cent of its imports from the 
EU were manufactured products.
6 Unlike other Latin America’s regions exporting minerals and fuels to 
the EU, Central America concentrates its primary exports on agricultural products (64.7 per cent of its 
exports in the 2000-2006 period). The degree of agricultural export diversification is still weak. In 2007, 
nearly  45  per  cent  of  Central  American  exports  to  the  EU  remained  dominated  by  two  traditional 
agricultural products, coffee and bananas (see Table 3). 
There are supply and demand reasons to explain this sectoral structure of the Central American 
exports. In the supply side, the countries of the region –with the exception of Costa Rica– have not made 
big efforts to diversify exports to the EU. Costa Rica has been the most successful country at adapting its 
exporting supply to the European demand, managing to modify it towards non-traditional agricultural 
products and some manufactures. This region’s behavior contrasts with the one observed in the United 
States  market,  for  that  the  Central  American  exports  have  been  able  to  diversify  their  composition, 
increasing the share of manufactures and incorporating new products, such as clothing maquila and in the 
case of Costa Rica, electronic products. 
Central America has achieved some agricultural export diversification by taking advantage of the 
special GSP regime granted in 1992 (the GSP-Drugs). Until that moment, the European GSP had been of 
little  relevance  since  Central  American  exports  to  the  EU  market  were  concentrated  on  agricultural 
products, whose coverage in the standard GSP had been minimal. Under the special regime, the non-
traditional agricultural products –such as tropical fruits, fish, crustaceans, plants and vegetables– have 
increased their share in the region’s export supply (see Table 3), but the diversification pace of that supply 
                                                           
     
6 The following product groups of the Standard International Trade Classification (Revision No. 3) are regarded as primary 
products: food and live animals; beverages and tobacco; crude materials, inedible, except fuels; mineral fuels, lubricants and 
related materials; and animal and vegetable oils, fats and waxes. The manufactured products include the following groups: 
chemicals and related products, n.e.s.; manufactured goods classified chiefly by material; machinery and transport equipment; 
and miscellaneous manufactured articles.  has been growing slowly. In fact, the utilization rate of the GSP by the region is not very high. Only 50.1 
per cent of the total value of the main Central American products exported to the EU benefited from the 
GSP in 2007, being Costa Rica the country that used it most with 65.8 per cent of the value of its main 
exports covered by these tariff preferences.
7 
In the demand side, the regulation of the EU market access is another explanatory factor of the 
current  Central  American  export  structure.  The  Common  Agricultural  Policy  (CAP)  and  the  special 
protocols for the ACP countries have restricted –through high tariff and non-tariff measures– the entry of 
traditional agricultural products exported by Central America, especially that of bananas, beef and sugar. 
Likewise, the EU’s GSP has incorporated the constraints inherent to preferential trade schemes. Although 
it  offers  an  opportunity  for  expanding  and  diversifying  the  Central  American  exports,  it  is  granted 
temporarily,  does  not  cover  products  of  great  interest  for  the  region
8 a n d  i s  s u b j e c t  t o  g r a d u a t i o n  
mechanisms.
9 F u r t h e r m o r e ,  t h e  s p e c i a l  G P S  r e g i m e  i n c l u d e s  a  s a f e g u a r d  c l a u s e  w h i c h  p e r m i t s  t h e  
reintroduction of the normal customs duties when the preferential agricultural imports are detrimental to 
European producers or handicap the exports of the ACP countries. 
In sum, trade relations between the EU and Central America are characterized by their scarce 
dynamism  and  their  asymmetries  in  the  relative  importance  of  the  mutual  trade  and  in  the  sectoral 
composition of the same one. The future prospects of these bi-regional relations will depend on the results 
of two fundamental negotiations: that of the AA with the EU, which will include a bi-regional free trade 
area; and that of the Doha Round in the framework of the WTO, which will determine the international 
trade regulation. 
 
Financial Relations 
 
Foreign Direct Investment 
Just as happens with the bi-regional trade exchange, Central America occupies a marginal position in the 
EU’s total foreign direct investment (FDI). In the 2001-2006 period, only 2.4 per cent of  total EU FDI 
flows and 6.3 per cent of total extra-EU FDI flows were channeled towards Central America, with El 
Salvador and Costa Rica being the main destinations.  Although in the last years there has been a recovery 
of the EU FDI flows to Latin America, these flows have not altered their high geographical concentration, 
feature maintained since the 1990s when those flows registered an unprecedented expansion. European 
FDI remains concentrated in the Southern Cone countries and Mexico. Of the total stock of €219,927 
million at the end of 2005, these countries accounted for 83 per cent (39 per cent in Brazil,  20 per cent in 
Mexico, 15 per cent in Argentina, 8 per cent in Chile and 1 per cent in Uruguay).
10  
By contrast, the European FDI has a higher relative importance for Central America, representing 
20 per cent of total FDI inflows in the 2000-2005 period (see Figure 3). This percentage turns the EU into 
the region’s second investor, followed closely by Latin America (17 per cent) and staying still very 
behind the first source of FDI, the United States (45 per cent). In the future, the RD-CAFTA’s entry into 
                                                           
    
7  SIECA  (Secretaría  de  Integración  Económica  Centroamericana),  Trade  Relations  between  Central  America  and  the 
European Union (Guatemala: SIECA, 2009), 19. 
    
8 The GSP scheme does not include agricultural products such as gold coffee, fresh bananas and some vegetables. In the case 
of manufactured products, textiles and apparel enjoy tariff preferences, but the exemption is only limited to 20 per cent of the 
Community customs tariff. 
    
9 The graduation mechanism is applied to beneficiary countries becoming competitive in one or more product groups exported 
to the EU market, and it involves the suspension of the GSP tariff advantages. Costa Rica was affected temporarily by this 
mechanism in 2003, when some of its export products (ornamental plants, ferns, pineapples, macadamias and melons) were 
“graduated” from the GSP scheme. Subsequently, the EU modified the graduation mechanism in such a way that it did not 
negatively affect small LDCs, as Costa Rica. The GSP scheme is offered to a great number of LDCs with very different levels of 
development, being the small LDCs at a disadvantage to compete on an equal basis in the EU market. 
    
10 All the percentages on European FDI flows and stocks refer to the EU with 25 member states. They were derived from: 
Eurostat database, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/. 
 force and the possible AA with the EU could encourage European FDI flows to the region and increase 
their share in total FDI inflows. 
 
 
Figure 3 
CENTRAL AMERICA: FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT INFLOWS
a BY REGION OF 
ORIGIN, 1997-2005 
(in millions of  US dollars) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
Source:  Derived  from:  INTAL  (Instituto  para  la  Integración  de  América  Latina  y  el  Caribe),  Informe 
centroamericano Nº. 3 (Buenos Aires: BID-INTAL, 2007), 122. 
a Information on foreign direct investment inflows into Guatemala is excluded because of lack of data. 
The figures for the rest of the Central American countries include investment in assembly manufacture. 
 
Official Development Assistance 
Along with FDI flows, those of Official Development Assistance (ODA) are the other relevant financial 
flows in bi-regional relations. Central America has had access to these flows since 1976, when the EU’s 
technical and financial assistance was extended to the Asian and Latin American countries. Although the 
region attracted an unusual attention from the EU in the 1980s, it was not able to maintain it after the 
ending of the Central American conflict. The EU member states’ economic interests in the region are 
insignificant and in political and geostrategic terms, Central America is deemed as a region reserved 
primarily to the United States’ sphere of influence. In other words, there are not essential reasons for 
privileging the cooperation with this region. This explains that Central America obtains a low volume of 
total EU aid. As Table 4 shows, in the 1997-2006 period the annual average of  net disbursements of the 
EU’s ODA to Central America was $120 million, what represented only 1.9 per cent of the EU’s total 
ODA. 
As has happened with the preferential trade schemes, the financial aid programs offered to the 
Central American countries have been less favorable than those available to other LDCs, such as the ACP 
and MEDA countries. Aid to the region has consisted mainly of grants financed by the EU general budget 
and long-term loans provided by the European Investment Bank (EIB). The Central American countries have not been entitled to other sources of aid outside the EU budget –such as the European Development 
Fund, financed by contributions from member states and destined for the ACP countries–, neither have 
they  benefited  from  financial  protocols  and  specific  financial  cooperation  programs  –such  as  those 
attached to the EU cooperation agreements signed with the MEDA countries–.  Moreover, until 1993 the 
Central  American  countries  were  not  able  to  request  aid  in  the  form  of  EIB  loans,  which  had  been 
exclusively at the disposal of the ACP and MEDA countries. 
 
 
Table 4 
CENTRAL AMERICA: NET DISBURSEMENTS OF OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT 
ASSISTANCE BY MAIN DONORS, 1997-2006 AVERAGE 
 (in millions of US dollars and in percentages of total) 
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Source:  Derived  from:  International  Development  Statistics  Online  database  of  the  Organization  for 
Economic  Co-operation  and  Development’s  Development  Assistance  Committee,  OECD-DAC, 
http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/idsonline/. 
EC: European Commission. 
EU: European Union. 
ODA: Official Development Assistance (net disbursements). 
 
 
Despite  all  that,  the  European  ODA  –i.e.  the  EU’s  multilateral  aid  and  the  member  states’ 
bilateral aid– is the first source of foreign aid to Central America. Unlike the EU’s trade policy which is a common policy exclusively exercised by the European Commission, the EU’s development cooperation 
policy is a Community policy, that is, it coexists with the member states’ respective bilateral aid policies. 
In the case of Central America, the EU and its member states taken as a whole are by far the leading 
donor  to  the  region.  Their  aggregated  contribution  represented  almost  45  per  cent  of  total  net 
disbursements of ODA received by the region in the 1997-2006 period (see Table 4). 
Unlike that evidenced in the trade and FDI flows, the United States is not the region’s main 
partner in the ODA flows. In the aforementioned 1997-2006 period, the United States provided 14.5 per 
cent of the total net ODA disbursed to Central America, becoming the third donor of the region, behind 
multilateral institutions (see Table 4). This lesser relative importance is the consequence of the United 
States policy initiated after the end of the Salvadoran civil war, consisting in reducing ODA and in 
turning FDI into the principal component of its financial flows to the region. 
One of the peculiarities of the EU as donor is its support to the Central American integration 
process, especially after putting into practice its regional cooperation strategy for the 2002-2006 period. 
Previously, the EU cooperation had centered more on the backing of the peaceful solution to the region’s 
armed conflicts and once these concluded, on the encouragement of mechanisms for consolidating and 
strengthening peace and democracy. Even then, there already existed precedents for the EU’s direct and 
indirect support to the regional integration process. One of the first direct supports goes back to December 
1990, when the EU financed the creation of the Central American Payments System as a part of the 
Central American Clearing House in a fruitless attempt to avoid its collapse. Likewise, since the 1980s 
the  EU  has  been  indirectly  encouraging    the  integration  process  through  subregional  cooperation 
programs, involving at least two Central American countries. 
In 2001 the European Commission signed the first regional Memorandum of Understanding with 
the General Secretariat of the Central American Integration System, in which a regional cooperation 
program  was  established  for  the  period  covering  the  EU’s  Financial  Perspectives  2000-2006.  This 
Memorandum was signed in a context of reform of the EU’s aid management, which led to the adoption –
among other measures– of the pluriannual strategy papers. Thus, the first Regional Strategy Paper for the 
EU’s  cooperation  with  Central  America  was  approved  for  the  2002-2006  period,  stating  the  EU 
commitment to the Central American integration process. This commitment responded not only to the 
European conviction that regional integration was able –as it had happened in the EU– to stimulate the 
Central American economic development, but also to the EU’s need to consolidate Central America as a 
single regional interlocutor, with whom to negotiate the AA in bloc and from whom to demand the 
homogeneous application of the AA in the whole region. 
The Regional Strategy 2002-2006 established three priority cooperation axes with a total budget 
of €74.5 million:
11 that of support to the regional integration process, the implementation of common 
policies and the consolidation of regional institutions (60 per cent of the budget); that of strengthening of 
the role of civil society in the integration process (10 per cent of the budget); and that of reduction of 
vulnerability and environmental improvement (30 per cent of the budget). The first two axes –with 70 per 
cent  of  the  budget–  h a v e  p r o m o t e d  t h e  f u n d i n g  o f  p r o g r a m s  w i t h  direct  incidence  on  the  regional 
integration process, such as that of Central American Customs Union (UAC), that of Support to the 
Central American Regional Integration (PAIRCA), that of Support to the Design and Application of 
Central American Common Policies (ADAPCCA) and that of Consolidation of the Central American 
Customs Union (CONSUAC).
12 
 
                                                           
    
11  The  2002-2006  Regional  Strategy  Paper  for  Central  America  can  be  consulted  on  line  in: 
http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/ca/. 
    
12 The meaning of the regional programs acronyms is the following: Central American Customs Union (Unión Aduanera 
Centroamericana, UAC), Support to the Central American Regional Integration (Programa de Apoyo a la Integración Regional 
Centroamericana, PAIRCA), Support to the Design and Application of Central American Common Policies (Apoyo al Diseño y 
Aplicación de Políticas Comunes Centroamericanas, ADAPCCA) and  Consolidation of the Central American Customs Union 
(Consolidación de la Unión Aduanera Centroamericana, CONSUAC). During the execution period of this Regional Strategy, the process of EU aid management reform 
was concluded.  In 2005 the European Consensus on Development was approved with the purpose of 
improving aid policy coordination between the European Commission and the member states. As a result 
of this Consensus, a new financing instrument –the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI)– was 
adopted, regrouping the different budgetary items. The DCI covers five geographical programs (one of 
them, that of Latin America) and five horizontal thematic programs. After its entry in force in 2007, it is 
expected that the development cooperation in Central America becomes more efficient and coherent. 
 
Table 5 
EUROPEAN COMMISSION COOPERATION WITH CENTRAL AMERICA: PRIORITY 
SECTORS FOR THE PERIOD 2007-2013 
 
Strategies 
 
Indicative Programs 
(in millions of euros) 
 
 
Regional Strategy (€75 million) 
 
 
1.  Strengthening the institutional system for regional 
integration (27%) 
2.  Consolidating the customs union and the related 
harmonized and common policies (63%) 
3.  Strengthening regional good governance and security 
matters (10%) 
 
 
 
20 
 
47 
 
8 
Country Strategies (€727 million)   
 
COSTA RICA (€34 million) 
1.  Social cohesion (75%) 
2.  Regional integration (25%) 
 
 
 
25.5 
 8.5 
EL SALVADOR (€121 million) 
1.  Social cohesion and human security (70%) 
2.  Economic growth, regional integration and trade (30%) 
 
 
84.7 
36.3 
GUATEMALA (€135 million) 
1.  Social cohesion (35%) 
2.  Economic growth and trade (65%) 
 
 
47.3 
87.7 
HONDURAS (€223 million) 
1.  Social cohesion (50%) 
2.  Natural resources (30%) 
3.  Justice and public security (20%) 
 
 
111 
 68 
 44 
NICARAGUA (€214 million) 
1.  Institutional support for sector programs (5%) 
2.  Governance and democracy (17.5%) 
3.  Education (35.0%) 
4.  Economic and trade issues (42.5%) 
 
 
10.7 
37.5 
74.9 
90.9 
  
Source: Derived from: the Regional Strategy Paper and the respective Country Strategy Papers, accessible 
on line in http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/ca/. 
 
In accordance with the DCI regulations for the 2007-2013 period,
13 the EU has begun to apply the 
pluriannual programming papers for each recipient region and country; that is, in the case of Central 
America, the Regional Strategy Paper and the respective Country Strategy Papers (see Table 5). Likewise, 
the  EU  has  continued  offering  the  regional  programs  set  up  for  the  whole  of  the  region  of  Latin 
America,
14 to which the Central American countries also have access. 
The  new  Regional  Strategy  2007-2013  keeps  the  priority  support  to  the  regional  integration 
process (90 per cent of the total budget),
15 although it does not incorporate a substantial injection of new 
financial resources (see Table 5). The total budget is practically the same as that one allocated for the 
previous p e r i o d  ( € 7 5  m i l l i o n ) .  T h e  t h r e e  p r i o r i t y  s e c t o r s  o f  t h e  S t r a t e g y  a i m s  a t  s trengthening  the 
institutional system for regional integration (27 per cent of the budget), consolidating the customs union 
and  the  related  harmonized  and  common  policies ( 6 3  p e r  c e n t  o f  t h e  b u d g e t )  a n d  s trengthening  the 
regional good governance and security (10 per cent of the budget). The first two sectors are directly 
related  to  integration,  giving  continuity t o  t h e  p r o g r a m s  l a u n c h e d  i n  2 0 0 2 -2006.  The  support  to 
integration is also reinforced by some Country Strategies –in particular, those ones of Costa Rica and El 
Salvador–, in which regional integration appears as one of the main intervention sectors. 
The future prospects for the EU regional cooperation will depend to a great extent on the outcome 
of the AA negotiation. In principle, Central America is likely to remain as a marginal destination for the 
EU’s ODA and given the budgetary restraints of the EU, it is unlikely to receive substantial increases in 
aid.  Likewise,  it  is  reasonable  to  expect  ODA  to  be  used  more  efficiently  thanks  to  the  new  DCI. 
However, if the AA negotiation concluded successfully, the volume of ODA might augment appreciably. 
The  region  will  require  a  larger  aid  inflow  to  finance  the  accompanying  policies  necessary  to  take 
advantages of the opportunities offered by the AA, as well as to reduce the costs of an AA signed between 
asymmetrical partners with significant differences in the levels of development. 
 
The Negotiation of the Association Agreement 
 
The Background 
The EU has formalized its relations with the countries of Latin America through successive “generations” 
of  bilateral and multilateral cooperation agreements. While those of first generation had a limited scope, 
those  of  second,  third  and  fourth  generation  have  been  framework  cooperation  agreements  covering 
cooperation in an growing number of sectors until coming to include the creation of a free trade area in 
the fourth-generation agreements. The latter agreements have marked a turning point in the pattern of the 
EU’s  relations  with  Latin  America,  since  until  that  moment  these  relations  had  presented  strong 
limitations in trade issues. 
The  fourth-generation  agreements  have  been  included  in  the  new  EU  policy  of  Strategic 
Association with Latin America, initiated in the mid-1990s. These agreements incorporate free trade, 
along with political dialogue and cooperation extended towards new sectors (such as intellectual property, 
science  and  technology,  telecommunications  and  information  technologies).  This  new  Strategic 
                                                           
    
13 The new cooperation policy was put into practice in the framework of the new Financial Perspectives 2007-2013, avoiding 
the previous gap between the strategies drawn up for the 2002-2006 period and the Financial Perspectives covering the 2000-
2006 period.  
    
14 These regional programs are developed in the fields of the higher education (ALFA and Alban), the economic cooperation 
among small and medium enterprises (AL-INVEST), the information society (@LIS), the urban local development  (URB-AL), 
the renewable electrical energies (Euro-Solar) and the social cohesion (Eurosocial). Detailed information on the contents of these 
programs can be found on line in: http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/latin-america/regional-cooperation/index_en.htm. 
    
15  The  2007-2013  Regional  Strategy  Paper  for  Central  America  can  be  consulted  on  line  in: 
http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/ca/. Association policy motivated the call for the first bi-regional Summit of Heads of State and Government 
held in Rio de Janeiro (1999) and has guided the subsequent four Summits of Madrid (2002), Guadalajara 
(2004), Vienna (2006) and Lima (2008). 
The specific bi-regional r el at i on bet ween t he EU and Cent r al  Amer i ca has devel oped i n t hi s 
context. It is currently dominated by a third-generation agreement, the  2003 Political Dialogue and 
Cooperation Agreement, which gives continuity to the previous agreements of Luxembourg (1985) and 
San Salvador (1993). This means that the bi-regional relation presents a fundamental imbalance. Whereas 
the advance in the political dialogue and cooperation areas has been considerable, the progress in the 
trade field has been more limited. 
In order to mitigate the aforementioned imbalance, the EU offered Central America the possibility 
of negotiating a fourth-generation agreement –that is, an AA– after the conclusion of the Guadalajara 
Summit  in  2004.  However,  the  EU  made  the  AA  signing  conditional u p o n  t h e  fulfillment  of  two 
requirements: firstly, Central America should demonstrate a sufficient level of consolidation and advance 
in its regional integration process; and secondly, the Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations should 
conclude successfully. The process conducting to the AA signing would begin with a first phase of joint 
evaluation of the Central American integration process and in due course, this would lead to a  second 
phase in which the AA negotiation would take place. 
Although the two requirements were not fulfilled, the EU decided to start the AA negotiation after 
the  2006  Vienna  Summit.  Three  fundamental  factors  explain  this  decision.  Firstly,    the  multilateral 
negotiations  of  trade  liberalization  under  the  WTO  framework  are  increasingly  slow  and  difficult  to 
control. This has encouraged  industrialized countries –as the EU and the United States– to support 
plurilateral processes of trade liberalization –such as the AA negotiation and the RD-CAFTA signing–. 
Secondly, the EU has succeeded in promoting the aforesaid trade liberalization processes in Latin 
America at a bilateral level –the AA signed with Mexico and Chile–, but not at a subregional level. This 
fact questions one of the distinctive features of its foreign policy: the support to the economic integration 
processes. The delicate situation of subregional integration in South America and the problems caused by 
this situation in the AA negotiation with the  Southern Common Market and the Andean Community, 
have substantially facilitated the EU decision of initiating the AA negotiation with Central America. 
The third and last factor is linked to the potential strategic value that  Central America might 
acquire as a trade axis among the United States, Asia and Europe. Although the EU’s economic interests 
are reduced, the European countries do not want to be at a disadvantage in this axis with respect to the 
United States and Asia, particularly in a future scenario in which the free trade area among Asia-Pacific 
Economic Cooperation (APEC) members becomes a reality (in principle, for 2010). The region strategic 
value  would  increase  significantly  if  the  Central  American  countries  ended  up  joining  APEC  or 
subscribing a free trade agreement (FTA) with some of its Asian members, as for example with China. 
The historical fact that Costa Rica has decided to move away from Taiwan and initiate the rapprochement  
with China –including the negotiation of a FTA– is an important strategic bet of the main FDI recipient 
country in Central America. 
With  regard  to  the  Central  American  governments’  motivations,  they  consider  the  potential 
signing  of  an  AA  incorporating  a  FTA  with  the  EU,  as  a  way  of  improving  their  insertion  in  the 
international economy. From the perspective of the mainstream policy paradigm, the Central American 
economies’ former fears of taking part in a FTA between asymmetrical partners, are unjustified. It is 
argued that the access to a larger export market through a FTA has the potential to be relatively more 
beneficial to the smaller economies than to the bigger ones, since the limited size of their market prevents 
them  from  relying o n  n a t i o n a l  d e m a n d  t o  b o o s t  a n d  m a i n t a i n   the  supply  of  goods  and  services.  In 
addition, this national market enlargement allows small economies to be more capable of attracting FDI 
inflows, necessary to compensate for the national savings deficit in the investment financing. 
 
The Issues of the Negotiation 
The AA negotiation process started in October 2007 in San José, Costa Rica, with the commitment to 
complete it within a period of two years. If negotiations develop adequately, they might conclude in 2009 with a possible AA subscription in the first semester of 2010, coinciding with  the Spanish presidency of 
the EU.
16 The process is getting complex, especially for the Central American party. In contrast to the 
EU’s unity of interlocution, Central America clearly does not appear as a single negotiator representing 
the  member  states  interests.  The  region  discarded  this  latter  option  and  decided  to  have  a  rotatory 
spokescountry for the negotiations. This has involved establishing a complicated coordination of three 
simultaneous negotiations: at the national level with the productive sectors and civil society of each 
country, at the regional level with the Central American counterparties and at the inter-regional level with 
the EU.
17 
Unlike the RD-CAFTA, the AA aspires to be a comprehensive agreement that includes not only 
trade commitments, but also political and cooperation commitments. However, the trade component of 
the  AA  will  be  the  predominant  in  the  negotiation,  as  the  bi-regional r e l a t i o n s  i n  t h e  o t h e r  t w o 
components have been tightening  since the beginning of the San José Dialogue.
18 
The negotiation issues of the political dialogue and cooperation components are very similar to 
those included in the Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement signed by both regions in 2003. This 
Agreement  has  been  taken  as  the  basis  negotiating  text  with  the  aim  of  broadening  its  content  and 
adapting it to current international context. In the political dialogue, the EU proposes the inclusion of 
three new priority issues: the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons of mass destruction, the fight against 
terrorism and the Central American countries joining the International Criminal Court. On its part, Central 
America emphasizes more the incorporation of issues such as the migration and the need for the region to 
have the financial facilities necessary to fulfill the AA commitments. In the cooperation component, both 
parties agree that the issues shaping the EU’s future cooperation with Central America will have to 
encompass the negotiation results of the AA’s other two components. 
The political and cooperation issues are those ones demonstrating to have a higher proximity of 
the two regions’ stances. However, these issues are not free from discrepancies either. One of the most 
important  is  that  one  raised  by  the  EU’s  request  for  the  Central  American  countries  to  join  the 
International Criminal Court. El Salvador, Guatemala and Nicaragua have showed a deep reluctance to 
fulfill  this  request.
19 T h e  t h r e e  c o u n t r i e s  h a v e  n o t  r a t i f i e d  t h e  R o m e  S t a t u t e  e s t a b l i s h i n g  a n d  g i v i n g  
jurisdiction to the International Criminal Court to prosecute crimes against humanity anywhere in the 
world. 
The negotiation of the AA’s trade component aims at creating a free trade area between the EU 
and Central America. This negotiation is based on a “region-to-region” approach, in such a way that the 
commitments will be undertaken by Central America as a bloc. This means that the AA implementation 
will involve the commitment to establish an effective free trade area not only inter-regional (with the EU), 
but also intra-regional (within the CACM). 
                                                           
    
16 The evolution of the negotiations can be followed on line in: http://www.caue.sieca.org.gt/ and http://www.aacue.go.cr/ . 
    
17 The inter-regional negotiation is carried out between the EU and the CACM. At the present time, Panama only takes part as 
an observer. The full incorporation into the AA negotiation would require Panama to join the CACM and therefore, undertake the 
commitments adopted to establish the Central American customs union. 
    
18 For a more detailed analysis of the main issues delimiting the negotiation of the three components of the AA, see: CEPA 
(Comisión de Estudios Políticos Alternativos), El sector agrícola centroamericano de cara al Acuerdo de Asociación con la 
Unión Europea: posibles escenarios (San José: CEPA, 2007); Luis Rivera and Hugo Rojas-Romagosa, Economic Implications of 
an Association Agreement between the European Union and Central America, IIDE discussion paper 200708-01 (Rotterdam: 
Institute for International and Development Economics, 2007); Rómulo Caballeros, Centroamérica: los retos del Acuerdo de 
Asociación con la Unión Europea (México, D.F.: Comisión Económica de las Naciones Unidas para América Latina y el Caribe, 
2008);  Doris Osterlof, “Centroamérica: del Proceso de San José al Acuerdo de Asociación con la Unión Europea” in América 
Latina  y  la  Unión  Europea:  una  integración  esperanzadora  pero  esquiva,  ed.  Doris  Osterlof,  99-122  (San  José:  Facultad 
Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales, 2008); SIECA, Trade Relations between Central America and the European Union, op. 
cit.. 
    
19 The situation of the Salvadoran government is particularly delicate. It has a bilateral agreement signed with the United 
States, guaranteeing the American citizens in Salvadoran territory will not be put under the jurisdiction of the International 
Criminal  Court.  Another  limitation  for  the  ratification  of  the  Rome  Statute  is  that  the  Salvadoran  Constitution  does  not 
contemplate life imprisonment. The coverage of issues under the trade negotiation is very similar to that observed in the AA 
signed with Mexico and Chile. Not only trade issues are negotiated, but also issues indirectly related to 
trade (the so-called behind-the-border issues). The main negotiating issues include trade in goods and 
services, investment, intellectual property, government procurement, competition policy, labor regulation, 
environment and institutions to administer and implement the AA.
20 In addition, the Central American 
party asks for all these issues to be negotiated taking into account the existing asymmetries between the 
two regions. 
The negotiation of trade liberalization in goods presents notable differences according to the type 
of good considered. In the case of manufactured goods, fewer problems in the tariff relief negotiation are 
expected, given the reduced presence of these goods in the Central American export supply. Nevertheless, 
there exist some manufactured products identified as sensitive in the GSP+, for which Central America 
aspires to improve its access to the EU market: among others, textiles and apparel, footwear, glass and 
articles thereof, and products of paper and cardboard. It is probable that these products will require a 
longer period of time to reach a consensus on the tariff relief schedule. 
In  the  case  of  agricultural  products,  the  discrepancies  between  both  parties  are  much  more 
significant. The trade liberalization of many non-traditional agricultural products –for example, those of 
tropical origin– presents fewer problems, since they are non-sensitive products covered by the GSP+. The 
opposite happens with the traditional agricultural products where serious disagreements are expected, 
particularly in products as bananas, beef and sugar. While Central America demands an improvement in 
the access of these products prevailing in its export supply, the EU systematically excludes them from the 
negotiations. Liberalizing these products would involve modifying the CAP and the special protocols 
granted to the ACP countries, something that at the present time, is not contemplated by the EU.  
An EU commitment in the delicate issue of the CAP agricultural subsidies is not expected either. 
The EU has traditionally considered it as an issue to be solved within the framework of the Doha Round 
of multilateral trade negotiations. Aware of this stance, Central America is negotiating alternative options 
for  attenuating  the  negative  effects  of  the  unfair  competition  from  highly-subsidized  European 
agricultural products (as for example, the dairy products  and some vegetables). 
In  addition  to  the  tariff  issues,  the  negotiation  of  trade  liberalization  in  goods  encompasses 
various  non-tariff  issues.  A  first  group  of  these  issues  refers  to  the  rules  of  origin,  the  technical 
regulations and the sanitary and phytosanitary measures. In these issues it is likely that both parties 
negotiate their adaptation to the principles established by the WTO both at the national and regional level. 
Many Central American countries have already begun this adaptation, but it is still necessary to advance 
in the adoption of a homogeneous regulation at the regional level. The results of this negotiation will 
determine the standards demanded by the EU for the access of the Central American exports. The other 
group  of  non-tariff  issues  is  centered  on  the  trade  defense  mechanisms  (antidumping,  countervailing 
duties and safeguards). In this case, it is also negotiated their adaptation to the WTO regulations to avoid 
their indiscriminate use with protectionist purposes.  
Along  with  the  reciprocal  goods  trade  liberalization,  the  AA  negotiation  embodies  the 
liberalization of services trade and foreign investment. In these issues, the EU presses to achieve a higher 
degree of liberalization, especially in the services sector where it has significant competitive advantages. 
Talks are focused on the normative part, specifically on the EU’s request for Central America to adopt a 
new legislation guaranteeing services sector liberalization, for example by assuming principles as that one 
of the service provider’s non-obligation to reside in the service recipient country or that  one of the non-
discriminatory treatment for the signatory countries’ service providers against national ones. In the same 
line, the EU demands the Central American Agreement on Investments and Services’ full coming into 
force, since it still has not been ratified by all the Central American countries. 
                                                           
    
20 Specifically, twelve negotiating trade issues have been agreed: market access, rules of origin, customs procedures, services, 
investments establishment, intellectual property, government procurement, trade defense, competition policy, dispute settlement, 
institutional arrangements and sustainable development. As for the issue of intellectual property rights, the adoption of a homogeneous legislation at the 
regional  level  is  negotiated.  The  EU  asks  Central  American  countries  to  subscribe  the  international 
agreements for intellectual property protection and to establish a regional mechanism to implement the 
commitments undertaken in those agreements. Some Central American governments are unwilling to 
endorse these commitments –as for example, that one of the geographical indications– because they argue 
that the EU uses them to restrict the region’s agro-industry exports. 
The trade negotiation also includes some of the so-called Singapore Issues, that is, issues which 
go  beyond  the  commitments  established  under  the  WTO  agreements.  These  are  the  cases  of  the 
liberalization of government procurement and the adoption of competition policy. In these areas there is 
no regional framework to regulate them, since they are subject to national laws. The EU is insisting on the 
need for Central America to establish regional regulations for both issues and to create a competent 
regional authority enforcing the competition rules. 
Finally, other issues incorporated into the trade negotiation are the regulations on labor rights and 
environment, as well as the institutional arrangements. In the labor and environmental issues, no great 
difficulties in negotiation are expected, since there exists a commitment not to use them as hidden forms 
of protectionism. As regards the institutional part, it is necessary to design mechanisms to administer and 
implement the AA, including a system of dispute settlement. It is likely that the EU will actively promote  
this regional institutional structure to ensure a homogeneous application of the AA in all the countries of 
the region. 
 
Conclusions 
 
Although the EU has limited economic interests in Central America, it is an important partner for the 
region. The EU is substantially much more relevant to Central America than the opposite. It is its third 
trade partner, its second investor and its first donor (considering both the EU’s multilateral aid and the 
member states’ bilateral aid). The future of these economic relations will be conditioned by the result of 
the AA negotiation.  
If the AA is not signed, the bi-regional relations will be based on the renewal of the 2003 Political 
Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement. Important limitations in the trade dimension of the bi-regional 
relations will go on existing. The GSP+ will be periodically extended until 2015 (that is, exhausting the 
decade 2006-1015) or only until 2010. The latter date is the one proposed by the European Parliament for 
the subscription of a Global Inter-regional AA with Latin America, which includes the creation of an 
Euro-Latin American free trade area. However, this possibility does not appear to be very feasible if the 
EU previously has not been able to sign AAs with the countries and subregions of Latin America.  
In this scenario, it is very unlikely that the current pattern of economic relations between the EU 
and Central America will change. The contribution of these relations to the region’s economic progress 
will be only perceptible in those countries achieving to diversify their exports to the EU market by taking 
advantage of the GSP+. Costa Rica will be the principal candidate for benefiting from these bi-regional 
relations, as it does at present. 
If, on the contrary, the AA is signed, an important deepening of the bi-regional relations will take 
place, laying the foundations for a long-term alliance between both regions. These relations will be more 
balanced and comprehensive, putting an end to the traditional imbalance between the broad advances in 
the political and cooperation dimensions and the limited scope of the trade dimension. The AA will allow 
to replace the current system of unilateral trade preferences (the GSP+) by another one of reciprocal trade 
liberalization (the FTA). 
This deepening of the bi-regional relations will strengthen the EU’s visibility as an international 
actor in the region. Along with the success achieved in its foreign policy in favor of peace and democracy 
in the previous century’s last decades, the EU will succeed in boosting the Central American integration 
process (as a result of the “region-to-region” approach followed in the AA negotiation). This last element 
will contribute to give more credibility to one of the distinctive features of its foreign policy: the support to the regional integration process among LDCs, on the conviction that it is an efficient instrument for 
economic development. 
The new pattern of bilateral relations will also be able to have a positive impact on the region’s 
own  economic  development  process.  It  will  depend  particularly  on  the  content  scope  of  the  trade 
component of the AA, as well as on the effective acknowledgement  of the asymmetry principle in the 
AA negotiation. 
If the AA includes the full trade liberalization in agricultural products considered as sensitive by 
the EU –for example, bananas and sugar–, Central America will obtain an important benefit in terms of 
trade  creation.  However,  it  is  very  improbable  that  this  degree  of  agricultural  liberalization  will  be 
reached in a context in which the Doha Round negotiations are stagnated and the EU budget devoted to 
the CAP is already allocated until 2013. In the short term, a significant trade creation is not foreseen, not 
only  due  to  the  aforementioned  limitations  in  the  market  access  liberalization  for  the  traditional 
agricultural products, but also because an important part of the region’s non-traditional export products 
already enjoys temporary preferential tariff in the EU market as part of the GSP+. In the medium and long 
term, it is more likely that there will be an increase in the trade flows as a result of the access of new 
products to the EU market. 
The  most  foreseeable  benefits  will  arise  from  the  FDI  attraction,  which  will  encourage    the 
economic growth of the region. The AA will provide a legal framework being more stable than that of the 
GSP+’s unilateral tariff reliefs and incorporating higher international standards for  the behind-the border 
issues, which will reinforce the regions’ ability to attract FDI. Nevertheless, it will not be an easy task or 
without risks, since the adoption of liberalizing measures in most of the behind-the-border issues will 
require internal legislative changes. It is possible that the Central American governments worry for the 
consequences  of  these  legislative  changes  will  augment,  since  they  limit  their  national  economic 
sovereignty and force them to homogenize their legislations with those of the EU countries. 
The AA on its own will not suffice to generate economic growth in Central America, unless it is 
accompanied by economic policies that make possible to take advantage of the offered opportunities and 
to reduce the potential risks. These policies will have to shape an agenda to accompany the AA, being 
negotiated at the national and regional level. Policies concerned with attracting investment and improving 
competitiveness, as well as with facilitating the adjustment of the social groups adversely affected by the 
AA, will have to form part of such an agenda. 
The  Central  American  governments’  ability  to  finance  the  accompanying  agenda  is  severely 
restricted by the scarce fiscal resources available, which might turn more limited by the negative fiscal 
effect of the AA’s tariff relief. To lessen this situation, it will be necessary to develop a comprehensive 
fiscal reform that increases government revenues –something that is not easy in Central America– and 
simultaneously, to resort to external loans and international cooperation. It would be advisable that the 
Central American governments have access to official financing on concessional terms and to aid inflows, 
avoiding further problems of external indebtedness. In this context, the EU cooperation could contribute 
to finance the accompanying agenda, incorporating some of its components as strategic axes of the future 
intervention in the region. It could be a way of reducing the asymmetry prevailing in the bi-regional 
economic relations. 
 
 
 